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Financial Crisis Inquiry Report

Financial Crisis Inquiry Report

  • Genres: 
    Business & economics
  • Languages: 
    English
  • Provider: Librivox
  • Price: $0.00
  • Rating: 
Here is the final report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission into the causes of the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. Two thorough Dissenting Statements accompany the final report. The report is a chronological compendium of the review of millions of pages of documents, the interviews of hundreds of leaders, CxOs, financial experts and academics, as well as common people, home- and business-owners who were also significantly affected by the financial meltdown. - Summary by Mario Pineda

Chapters

  • 01
    Preface
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  • 02
    Conclusions of the Commission
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  • 03
    Conclusions of the Commission, concluded
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  • 04
    Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 1
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  • 05
    Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 2
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  • 06
    Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 3
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  • 07
    Ch. 2. Shadow Banking: Commercial Paper and Repos
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  • 08
    Ch. 2. Shadow Banking: The Savings and Loan Crisis
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  • 09
    Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
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  • 10
    Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: Structured Finance
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  • 11
    Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: The Growth of Derivatives
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  • 12
    Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Expansion of Banking Activities
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  • 13
    Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Long-Term Capital Management
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  • 14
    Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Dot-Com Crash
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  • 15
    Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: The Wages of Finance
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  • 16
    Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Financial Sector Growth
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  • 17
    Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Mortgage Securitization
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  • 18
    Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Greater Access to Lending
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  • 19
    Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Subprime Lenders in Turmoil
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  • 20
    Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: The Regulators
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  • 21
    Ch. 6. Credit Expansion: Housing, A Powerful Stabilizing Force
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  • 22
    Ch. 6. Credit Expansion: Subprime Loans, Buyers Will Pay A Premium
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  • 23
    Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Citigroup: Invited Regulatory Scrutiny
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  • 24
    Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Federal Rules: Intended to Curb Unfair or Abusive Lending
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  • 25
    Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. States: Long-Standing Position
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  • 26
    Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Community-Lending Pledges: What We Do Is Reaffirm Our Intention"
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  • 27
    Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Bank Capital Standards: "Arbitrage"
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  • 28
    Ch. 6. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 6
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  • 29
    Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. An Irresistible Profit Opportunity
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  • 30
    Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Mortgages: A Good Loan
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  • 31
    Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Federal Regulators: Immunity from Many State Laws is a Significant Benefit
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  • 32
    Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Wall Street Was Very Hungry For Our Product
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  • 33
    Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Moody's: Given A Blank Check
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  • 34
    Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Less Competition in the Marketplace
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  • 35
    Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 7
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  • 36
    Ch. 8. The CDO Machine
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  • 37
    Ch. 8. We Created the Investor
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  • 38
    Ch. 8. Bear Stearns' Hedge Funds: It Functioned Fine Up Until One Day It Just Didn't Function
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  • 39
    Ch. 8. Citigroup's Liquidity puts: A Potential Conflict of Interest
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  • 40
    Ch. 8. AIG:Golden Goose for the Entire Street
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  • 41
    Ch. 8. Goldman Sachs: Multiplied the Effects of the Collapse in Subprime
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  • 42
    Ch. 8. Moody's: Achieved Through Some Alchemy
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  • 43
    Ch. 8. SEC: It's Going to be an Awfully Big Mess
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  • 44
    Commission Conclusions on Chapter 8
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  • 45
    Chapter 9. The Bubble, "A Credit-induced Boom"
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  • 46
    Mortgage Fraud: Crime-facilitative environments
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  • 47
    Disclosure and due diligence: A Quality Control Issue in the Factory
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  • 48
    Regulators: markets will always self-correct
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  • 49
    Leveraged Loans and Commercial Real Estate: You've Got to Get Up and Dance
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  • 50
    Lehman: From Moving to Storage
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  • 51
    Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Two Stark Choices
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  • 52
    2006: Increase Our Penetration into Subprime. 2007: Moving deeper into the credit pool
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  • 53
    Affordable housing goals: "GSEs cried bloody murder forever." The impact of the goals
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  • 54
    Commission Conclusions on Chapter 9
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  • 55
    Ch. 10. CDO Managers: "We Are Not A Rent-A-Manager"
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  • 56
    Ch. 10. Credit Default Swaps: "Dumb Question"
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  • 57
    Citigroup: "I Do Not Believe We Were Powerless"
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  • 58
    AIG: "I'm Not Getting Paid Enough to Stand on These Tracks"
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  • 59
    Merrill Lynch: "Whatever It Takes"
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  • 60
    Regulators: "Are Undue Concentrations of Risk Developing?"
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  • 61
    Moody's: "It Was All About Revenue"
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  • 62
    Commission Conclusions on Chapter 10
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  • 63
    Ch. 11. The Bust. Delinquencies: "The Turn of the Housing Market"
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  • 64
    Ch. 11. Rating Downgrades: "Never Before"
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  • 65
    Ch. 11. CDOs: "Climbing the Wall of Subprime Lending"
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  • 66
    Ch. 11. Legal Remedies: "On the Basis of the Information"
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  • 67
    Ch. 11. Losses: "Who Owns Residential Credit Risk?"
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  • 68
    Commission Conclusions on Ch. 11
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  • 69
    Early 2007: Spreading Subprime Worries
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  • 70
    Ch. 12. Goldman: Let's be Aggressive
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  • 71
    Bear Stearns's Hedge Funds
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  • 72
    Rating Agencies
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  • 73
    AIG: Well Bigger
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  • 74
    Commission Conclusions on Ch. 12
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  • 75
    Chapter 13 Summer 2007: Disruptions in Funding Intro
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  • 76
    Ch 13 IKB of Germany "Real Money Investors"
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  • 77
    Ch 13 Countrywide: "That's our 9/11"
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  • 78
    Ch 13 BNP Paribas: "The ringing of the bells"
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  • 79
    Ch 13 SIVs: "An Oasis of Calm"
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  • 80
    Ch 13 Money funds and other investors: "Drink[ing] from a fire hose"
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  • 81
    Commission conclusions on Chapter 13
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  • 82
    Chapter 14 Late 2007 to early 2008: Billions in subprime losses (Intro)
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  • 83
    Ch 14 Merrill Lynch: "Dawining awareness over the course of the summer"
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  • 84
    Ch 14 Citigroup: "That would not in any way have excited my attention"
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  • 85
    Ch 14 AIG's dispute with Goldman: "There could never be losses"
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  • 86
    Ch 14 Federal Reserve: "The discount window wasn't working"
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  • 87
    Ch 14 Monoline Insurers: "We never expected losses"
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  • 88
    Commission Conclusions on Chapter 14
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  • 89
    Chapter 15 March 2008: The fall of Bear Stearns (Intro)
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  • 90
    Ch 15 "I requested some forbearance"
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  • 91
    Ch 15 "We were suitably skeptical"
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  • 92
    Ch 15 "Turn into a death spiral"
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  • 93
    Ch 15 "Duty to protect their investors"
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  • 94
    Ch 15 "The Government would not permit a higher number"
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  • 95
    Ch 15 "It was heading to a black hole"
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  • 96
    Commission Conclusions on Chapter 15
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  • 97
    Chapter 16 March to August 2008: Systemic Risk Concerns (Intro)
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  • 98
    Ch 16 The Federal Reserve: "When people got scared"
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  • 99
    Ch 16 JP Morgan: "Refusing to unwind...would be unforgiveable"
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  • 100
    Ch 16 The Fed and the SEC: "Weak liquidity position"
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  • 101
    Ch 16 Derivatives: "Early stages of assessing the potential systemic risk"
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  • 102
    Ch 16 Banks: "The markets were really, really dicey"
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  • 103
    Commission Conclusions on Chapter 16
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  • 104
    Chapter 17 September 2008: The takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Intro)
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  • 105
    Ch 17 "A good time to buy"
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  • 106
    Ch 17 "The only game in town"
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  • 107
    Ch 17 "It's a time game...be cool"
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  • 108
    Ch 17 "The idea strikes me as perverse"
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  • 109
    Ch 17 "It will increase confidence"
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  • 110
    Ch 17 "Critical unsafe and unsound practices"
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  • 111
    Ch 17 "They went from zero to three with no warning in between"
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  • 112
    Ch 17 "The worst-run financial institution"
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  • 113
    Ch 17 "Wasn't done at my pay grade"
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  • 114
    Commission Conclusions on Chapter 17
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  • 115
    Chapter 18 September 2008: The bankruptcy of Lehman (Intro)
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  • 116
    Ch 18 "Get more conservatively funded"
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  • 117
    Ch 18 "This is not sounding good at all"
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  • 118
    Ch 18 "Spook the market"
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  • 119
    Ch 18 "Imagination hat"
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  • 120
    Ch 18 "Heads of family"
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  • 121
    Ch 18 "Tell those sons of bitches to unwind"
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  • 122
    Ch 18 "This doesn't seem like it is going to end pretty"
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  • 123
    Ch 18 "The only alternative was that Lehman had to fail"
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  • 124
    Ch 18 "A calamity"
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  • 125
    Commission Conclusions on Chapter 18
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  • 126
    Chapter 19 September 2008: The bailout of AIG (Intro)
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  • 127
    Ch 19 "Current liquidity position is precarious"
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  • 128
    Ch 19 "Spillover effect"
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  • 129
    Ch 19 "Like a gnat on an elephant"
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  • 130
    Commission Conclusions on Chapter 19
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  • 131
    Chapter 20 Crisis and Panic (Intro)
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  • 132
    Ch 20 Money market funds: "Dealers weren't even picking up their phones"
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  • 133
    Ch 20 Morgan Stanley: "Now we're the next in line"
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  • 134
    Ch 20 Over-the-counter derivatives "A grinding halt"
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  • 135
    Ch 20 Washington Mutual "It's yours"
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  • 136
    Ch 20 Wachovia "At the front end of teh dominoes as other dominoes fell"
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  • 137
    Ch 20 TARP "Comprehensive approach"
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  • 138
    Ch 20 AIG "We needed to stop the sucking chest wound in this patient"
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  • 139
    Ch 20 Citigroup "Let the world know we will not pull a Lehman"
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  • 140
    Ch 20 Bank of America "A shotgun wedding"
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  • 141
    Commission Conclusions on Chapter 20
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  • 142
    Chapter 21 The Economic Fallout (Intro)
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  • 143
    Ch 21 Households "I'm not eating, I'm not sleeping"
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  • 144
    Ch 21 Businesses "Squirrels storing nuts"
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    Ch 21 Commercial real estate: "Nothing's moving"
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    Ch 21 Government: "State struggled to close shortfalls"
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    Ch 21 The financial sector: "Almost triple the level of three years earlier"
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    Ch 22 Foreclosures on the rise: "Hard to talk about any recovery"
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  • 149
    Ch 22 Initiatives to stem foreclosures "Persistently disregard"
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  • 150
    Ch 22 Flaws in the process: "Speculation and worst-case scenarios"
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  • 151
    Ch 22 Neighborhood effects: "I'm not leaving"
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  • 152
    Commission Conclusions on Chapter 22
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  • 153
    Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Intro
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  • 154
    Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - How our approach differs from others?
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  • 155
    Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Stages of the crisis
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  • 156
    Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The ten essential causes of the financial and economic crisis
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  • 157
    Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The credit bubble: global capita flows, underpriced risk, and Federal Reserve policy
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  • 158
    Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The housing bubble
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  • 159
    Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Turning bad mortgages into toxic financial assets
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  • 160
    Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Big bank bets and why banks failed
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  • 161
    Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Two types of systemic failure
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  • 162
    Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The shock and panic
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  • 163
    Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The system freezing
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  • 164
    Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - Intro
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  • 165
    Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - Summary
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  • 166
    Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 1. Government policies resulted in an unprecedented number of risky mortgages
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  • 167
    Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 2. The great housing bubble and its effects
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  • 168
    Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 3. Delinquency rates on nontraditional mortgages
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  • 169
    Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 4. The origin and growth of subprime PMBS
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  • 170
    Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 5. What was known about NTMs prior to the crisis?
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  • 171
    Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 6. Conclusion
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  • 172
    Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - Intro
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  • 173
    Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - How failures among NTMs were transmitted to the financial system
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  • 174
    Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - The defaults begin
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  • 175
    Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - Intro
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  • 176
    Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 1. HUD's central role
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  • 177
    Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 2. The decline of mortgage underwriting standards
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  • 178
    Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 3. The affordable housing goals were the sole reason that the GSEs' acquired so many NTMs, part 1
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  • 179
    Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 3. The affordable housing goals were the sole reason that the GSEs' acquired so many NTMs, part 2
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  • 180
    Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 4. Competition between the GSEs and FHA for subprime and alt-a mortgages
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  • 181
    Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 5. Enlisting mortgage bankers and subprime lenders in affordable housing
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  • 182
    Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 6. The community reinvestment act
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  • 183
    Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - IV. Conclusion
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